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JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2) (2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Delta Delta Delta ("DDD") respectfully disagrees with the statement of the issues
presented by Theta Phi House Corporation of Delta Delta Delta ("house corporation").
The house corporation raises numerous unpreserved and irrelevant issues. There are
three issues before the Court.
Issue No. 1: Should the Court apply the preservation rule and decline to consider
the arguments the house corporation raises on appeal but did not argue to the district
court?
Standard of Review: Assignments of error not brought before the district court
will not be considered on appeal in the absence of plain error or exceptional
circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, <ft 11, 10 P.3d 346. If an
appellant failed to preserve an argument, it must raise any argument that the unpreserved
issue may be reviewed because of the plain error or exceptional circumstances doctrine in
its opening brief. State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, f 45, 114 P.3d 551, citing State v.
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995); see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)
(appellant's opening brief must include either a citation to the record showing that the
issue was preserved or a "statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not
preserved in the trial court").
Issue No. 2: Did the trial court correctly find the house corporation was required
by the plain language of its Bylaws to convey property to DDD?
1

Standard of Review:

An appellate court reviews a district court's "legal

conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment' for correctness." Orvis v.
Johnson, 2008 UT 2, f 6, 177 P.3d 600, citing Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, f 8, 152
P.3d312.
Issue No. 3: If this court decides to review the unpreserved rule against
perpetuities issue, should it apply the charitable exception to that rule and find that the
house corporation's Bylaws are not void?
Standard of Review:

As this is a legal determination, the Court would, if it

decides to review the issue, analyze the issue for correctness. Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT
2, f 6, P.3d, citing Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, f 8, 152 P.3d 312. There is,
however, no standard of review in the traditional sense, as there is no decision to review.
GOVERNING L A W

There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations
determinative of or of central importance to the appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

DDD sued the house corporation on July 27, 2006. DDD specifically sought to
enforce the house corporation's Bylaws and Affidavit of Incorporation. (R. 1-7.) As
such DDD prayed for specific performance of these contracts. (R. 4.) After discovery,
the house corporation moved for summary judgment on a single argument. (R. 188-196.)
It claimed that DDD could not enforce its Bylaws and Affidavit of Incorporation because
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DDD had not paid consideration for the house corporation's promise to convey real
property to DDD upon deactivation of the local chapter. Id.
DDD opposed the house corporation's motion and filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment. {See R. 226-252.) The cross-motions were fully briefed, and after
argument, the district court granted DDD's motion for summary judgment in part. (R.
613-620.) The Court held that DDD could enforce the house corporation's Bylaws and
Affidavit of Incorporation, and ordered the house corporation to convey title to DDD. Id.
The house corporation refused to convey title, and DDD was forced to move the court to
judicially convey the property pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 70. (R. 626631.) This appeal challenges only the district court's partial granting of summary
judgment to DDD. (Appellant's Br. 3-4.) That order required the house corporation to
vest title in the property in DDD.
B.

Statement of Facts

The house corporation is registered with the State of Utah as a non-profit
corporation. (R. 190.) The house corporation has registered with the IRS as a 501(c)(2)
corporation, which qualifies it as a subsidiary of Delta Delta Delta Fraternity ("DDD").
(R. 254.) The house corporation exists for the sole purpose of holding title to property
used by the Theta Phi Chapter of Delta Delta Delta ("local chapter"), which operated a
sorority at the University of Utah. Id. The local chapter operated out of 1431 East 100
South in Salt Lake City, Utah ("the property"). (R. 2.) The organizations are charitable;
they exist for the betterment of women and the community. (R. 312, 364.)

3

The house corporation is governed by the terms of its Affidavit of Incorporation as
well as its Bylaws. (R. 369.) As it is a subsidiary of DDD and exists to hold title for
DDD's property, the house corporation was required by DDD to adopt Articles of
Incorporation and Bylaws that were in accord with the Model Bylaws for house
corporations drafted by DDD. (R. 345-346.) If the house corporation refused to adopt
such articles and bylaws, DDD could decertify the local chapter of DDD. (Id.; R. 324.)
The local chapters, which are organized under the Bylaws of DDD, provided the
tenants for the house corporation, and therefore, the income stream to allow it to operate
and function and exist. (R. 262.) This tripartite arrangement provided substantial
benefits for the house corporation, the local chapter, and DDD. The house corporation
was provided with tenants and improvements to the real property to which it held title.
(R. 418-420.) DDD also provided the house corporation with a loan to improve the
property. Id.
The benefits DDD conveyed on the local chapter also inured to the house
corporation. DDD sent advisors to the local chapter much more frequently than normal
in an attempt to keep the flagging local chapter afloat. (R. 392, 427.) These services
helped the local chapter recruit tenants who provided the house corporation's primary
stream of revenue. Id. DDD provided the rules that new members and members of the
local chapter would follow. (R. 350.)
The Obligations of Membership contract that DDD required local chapter
members to sign operated to protect the property by regulating the use of alcohol and
banning drugs as well as requiring local chapter members not living at home or in
4

university housing to live in the property. Id. If a local chapter fails to meet the
requirements of DDD, it would and could lose its charter, or in other words "be
decertified" or "inactivated." {See R. 259.)
Before this suit was commenced, DDD's Bylaws required that house corporations
supervise and hold title to the property "in conformity with [DDD's] Bylaws [and the]
Model Bylaws for house corporations." (R. 263, 327, 346) (emphasis in the original).
The house corporation was also informed that it was a "necessity]" that it maintain
articles and bylaws that conformed with DDD's. (R. 285.) DDD Bylaws and the Model
Bylaws for house corporations required the house corporation to vest title in any property
it held to DDD if the local chapter was deactivated. (R. 303, 309, 345).
Pursuant to DDD's Bylaws and Model Bylaws for house corporations, the house
corporation's Affidavit of Incorporation and its Bylaws include the provisions that the
house corporation must vest title in all property it holds in DDD, and it must dissolve if
the local chapter is deactivated. This was consistent with DDD's Bylaws, with which the
house corporation's Affidavit of Incorporation and Bylaws could not conflict. House
corporation amended its Bylaws on February 8, 1991. (R. 369). It amended its Affidavit
of Incorporation on April 8, 2002. The house corporation's Bylaw's currently provide a
simple, two-pronged approach that it must follow if the local chapter is deactivated. The
house corporation must vest title in all property it holds in DDD, and it must dissolve.
(R. 376). The 1991 Bylaws follow the Model Bylaws for house corporations provided by
DDD. {See R. 296-304; 369-377.)
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If the house corporation had not amended its Bylaws, DDD could have or would
have been forced to deactivate the local chapter. (R. 345, 346.) Deactivation of the local
chapter by DDD would cost the house corporation its stream of income as well as support
services and monetary aid from DDD. (R. 265.)
Additionally, if the local chapter was inactivated or the house corporation refused
to adopt the Model Bylaws promulgated by DDD, the house corporation would not be
eligible for casualty insurance provided by DDD for the property. (R. 262.) Aside from
incurring the expense to procure new insurance, there is a real chance that the house
corporation would have had substantial difficulty finding an insurer to underwrite a
replacement cost policy for a fraternity house. (R. 263.) In any event, the liability
protection afforded by the policy is substantially less expensive than the house
corporation could have found on the open market. (R. 265.)
Despite DDD's unusually high level of support DDD provided to the local chapter
and the house corporation, the local chapter failed to recruit a sufficient number of new
members to maintain a viable chapter. DDD deactivated the local chapter effective April
30, 2006. (R. 266-277.) DDD's president contacted the house corporation requesting
that the property's title be vested in DDD pursuant to the Bylaws of the house
corporation and DDD. (R. 267).
The house corporation refused to vest title to the property in DDD. Id. The
president of the house corporation proposed alternative plans for the property, rented it in
contravention of the house corporation's Bylaws, and stated in her deposition that she did
not consider herself to be bound by the house corporation's Bylaws. (R. 267-277, 359,
6

376.) None of the suggestions were permissible under the Bylaws of the house
corporation or DDD.
DDD brought suit. (R. 1.) The district court partially granted summary judgment
in favor of DDD, but the house corporation still refused to vest title in the property in
DDD. (See R. 626-632.) The district court judicially conveyed the property to DDD on
March 27, 2008. (R. 649-653.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The cross-motions for summary judgment focused on a single, discrete issue—
whether or not DDD provided consideration for the house corporation's promise to
convey the house to DDD if the local chapter was deactivated. No other issue is properly
raised on appeal. The house corporation never asked the trial court to consider:
• Whether the Bylaws and Affidavit of Incorporation were properly adopted;
• Whether the house corporation's promise to vest title to the property in DDD upon
deactivation of the local chapter violated the common law rule against
perpetuities;
• Whether the house corporation had to be dissolved before the district court could
order it to convey the property;
• Whether the house corporation's Bylaws only entitled DDD to reversion of
property DDD once owned; or
• Whether DDD improperly raised a cause of action in oral arguments.
The house corporation failed to list facts upon which these theories are based in its
"Statement of Material Facts." It never gave the trial court any inkling that it was
advancing these defenses. The house corporation failed to preserve the issues, has not
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claimed that the plain error or extraordinary circumstances exception apply. The issues
are therefore not properly before this Court.
Regardless of whether DDD is a party to the Bylaws and Affidavit of
Incorporation, it has standing to enforce those contracts because it is a third party
beneficiary of the clause in the Bylaws requiring the house corporation to vest title in
DDD upon deactivation of the local chapter. Moreover, DDD has paid consideration for
its promise (even though it is not required to as a third party beneficiary).
DDD, the local chapter, and the house corporation had a unique tripartite
relationship in which DDD provided money, loans, and insurance directly to the house
corporation as well as support to the local chapter that facilitated the house corporation's
source of income. If the house corporation had not adopted the bylaw in question, DDD
could have and was likely required to decertify the local chapter, which would have cost
the house corporation its source of income and all of the direct and indirect benefits it
received from DDD, as well as require it, under its Affidavit of Incorporation and
Bylaws, to dissolve. Thus, DDD's forbearance in decertifying the local chapter
constitutes fair and reasonable consideration to support the house corporation's promise
to convey the property to DDD.
The local chapter was deactivated, and the house corporation was therefore
required to vest title of the property in DDD. (R. 376.) The district court correctly found
that DDD had standing to enforce this provision, and it properly applied the plain
language of the Bylaws and Affidavit of Incorporation when it ordered the house
corporation to convey the house to DDD.
8

The house corporation also attempts to belatedly argue that its promise to vest title
in DDD is void under the rule against perpetuities. The argument is not preserved. It
was absent from the house corporation's motion for summary judgment, its opposition to
DDD's motion for summary judgment, and the oral argument held on the foregoing
motions. The trial court had no opportunity to rule on the issue, and since the house
corporation fails to argue that the plain error or exceptional circumstances doctrines
apply, the preservation rule bars review of this purported issue as well. Moreover, even if
the Court does review the issue, the charitable purpose exception makes the rule against
perpetuities inapplicable to the house corporation's promise to vest title in DDD.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE HOUSE CORPORATION FAILED TO PRESERVE AND WAIVED
MOST OF THE ARGUMENTS IT RAISES ON APPEAL.
The house corporation appeals the district court's partial granting of DDD's

Motion for Summary Judgment. In the briefing and argument of the appealed decision,
the house corporation argued only that summary judgment was inappropriate because
DDD had not provided consideration for the benefits it undisputedly would receive from
the house corporation's Bylaws. (R. 188-197.)
The house corporation now asks this Court to review at least five supplemental
arguments that it never presented to the district court. The district court never had an
opportunity to decide these issues, and the house corporation has waived them pursuant
to the preservation rule. To hold otherwise would shift the burden of advocacy from
counsel, who is responsible for arguing his or her client's case, to the district court, which
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should not be required to scour the record for arguments not raised by counsel before it
grants summary judgment.
Assignments of error not brought before the district court will not be considered
on appeal in the absence of plain error or exceptional circumstances.1 See, e.g., State v.
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346 (citations omitted). The preservation rule
requires appellants to timely and specifically object to a ruling by the district court so that
the court would have an opportunity to address the issue. Id.; State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d
29, 36 (Utah 1998).
Whether or not an issue is preserved is a "threshold issue;" no relief may be
granted for unpreserved arguments that do not fit an exception to the preservation rule.
LeBaron & Associates, Inc. v. Rebel Enterprises, Inc., 823 P.2d 479, 482 (Utah App.
1991). The preservation rule furthers two policies. First, the trial court is "the proper
forum in which to commence thoughtful and probing analysis of issues." State v. Brown,
856 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah App. 1993), citing State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah
App. 1990) (internal quotations omitted). The district court must be afforded the
opportunity to address legal issues before they are raised on appeal, "and if appropriate,
correct [its error.]" Eldredge, 113 P.2d at 36. If a litigant fails to give the court such an
opportunity, it waives its right to raise the argument on appeal. Id.

1

If an appellant intends to rely on the exceptions to the preservation rule, it must
"articulate an appropriate justification for appellate review" in its opening brief. See
State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, f 45, 114 P.3d 551, citing State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,
1229 n.5 (Utah 1995); Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, f 9, 17 P.3d 1122. House
corporation does not argue that any exception applies. It is therefore barred from arguing
that an exception applies in its reply memorandum. Coleman, 2000 UT 98 at f 9.
10

Second, the preservation rule discourages procedural or tactical gamesmanship
which hinder judicial economy. "[A] defendant should not be permitted to forego
making an objection with the strategy of 'enhancing the defendant's chances [of
obtaining a no-cause verdict] and then, if the strategy fails,... claiming] on appeal that
the Court should reverse."' Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at f 11, citing and quoting State v.
Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989). All arguments relevant to the outcome of a
lawsuit should be raised during a proceeding in the district court level that could lead to a
final judgment. See generally id.
The house corporation incorrectly suggests that raising affirmative defenses in its
Answer is sufficient to preserve those arguments for appeal, even though they were
excluded from the briefing of the parties' summary judgment motions. This position has
been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. "Raising of an issue in the answer . .. without
supporting evidence .. . does not present to the trial judge for a decision and preserve the
issue for appeal." R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11,112, 40 P.3d 1119 (citation
omitted). This Court has also held that "to preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party
must timely bring the issue to the attention of the trial court, thus providing the court an
opportunity to rule on the issue's merits." LeBaron & Associates, 823 P.2d at 483, citing
Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982).
In LeBaron, this Court held that an appellant could not rely on the affirmative
defenses raised in its defense for a basis for preservation. "The mere mention of an issue
in the pleadings . . . is insufficient to raise an issue at trial and thus insufficient to
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preserve the issue for appeal." Id, at 483. Yet the house corporation now attempts to
raise issues it obliquely raised in its Answer and never raised again to the district court.
The house corporation made no mention at all of these arguments in its briefings
to the district court. In fact, the house corporation's new arguments on appeal expressly
contradict positions it took in the district court. For instance, in its own Motion for
Summary Judgment the house corporation asserted that the amendments to its Bylaws
and Affidavit of Incorporation were properly adopted in the 1990s. (R. 190.) On appeal
it attempts to retract that position. Additionally, in the house corporation's Memorandum
in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment as well as its Memorandum in
Opposition to DDD's Motion for Summary Judgment, it sets forth "Material Facts" and
responds to DDD's material facts. These responses should have set forth all of the facts
necessary for the Court to determine whether there was a genuine issue of material fact.
Utah R. Civ. P. 7.
The house corporation never raised any factual or legal issues related to any of its
various assignments of error. (R. 188-197.) The following issues are not preserved:
• Whether the Bylaws and Affidavit of Incorporation were properly adopted;
• Whether the house corporation's promise to vest title to the property in DDD
violated the common law rule against perpetuities;
• Whether the house corporation had to be dissolved before the district court could
order it to vest title of the property in DDD;
• Whether the house corporation's Bylaws only entitled DDD to reversion of
property it once owned; or
• Whether DDD improperly raised a cause of action in oral arguments.
(R. 188-197.)
12

DDD also asks the Court to consider the practical effect of permitting
consideration of the house corporation's arguments. The preservation rule promotes
judicial economy by forcing litigants to raise all important issues at the trial court level
instead of withholding some to raise on appeal. It is not uncommon to see answers which
include substantially in excess of fifty affirmative defenses. Defenses are culled down in
discovery, and district courts and litigants need not be concerned with them when
briefing and deciding summary judgment motions or conducting trials.
The house corporation's position, however, would change the current practice,
which places the burden on a party to brief its position and force district courts and other
litigants to consider dozens of mostly or wholly irrelevant affirmative defenses when
seeking resolution of a case. This would waste the courts' and the parties' time and
resources. This Court should therefore hold that if a party intends to rely on an
affirmative defense, it must raise that defense in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE HOUSE
CORPORATION'S BYLAWS WHEN IT ORDERED CONVEYANCE.
The Bylaws adopted and used by the house corporation until the start of this

litigation unambiguously require it to "vest" all rights, interest, and title to the property in
DDD upon deactivation of the local chapter. (R. 376.) It is undisputed that the local
chapter was deactivated. (R. 395.) The Bylaws unambiguously evidence the house
corporation's intention to make DDD a third party beneficiary to the Bylaws. (R. 376.)
It is undisputed that as the parent of the house corporation, the Bylaws of DDD and the
13

house corporation form contracts between those two parties. DDD has therefore shown
an unambiguous contract that gives it the right to have the house corporation vest title in
the property in DDD. It has shown the right to enforce that promise.
To show that the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment to
DDD, house corporation would have had to show that the Bylaws are unenforceable or
that DDD cannot enforce the Bylaws. No fact supports either argument and the district
court should be affirmed.
A.

The house corporation waived any right to challenge the manner in which
it adopted its Bylaws or Affidavit of Incorporation.

As addressed in Section I above, the house corporation never claimed that the
Bylaws or Affidavit should not be enforced for procedural reasons to the district court.
The court therefore never had a chance to rule on the issues, and this Court should
decline to address these arguments.
This unpreserved argument is troubling to DDD. If it had been raised at the trial
court, DDD could have shown that, insofar as the Bylaws constituted an unenforceable
contract, DDD could still enforce the promise based on promissory estoppel. It allowed
the local chapter and the house corporation to continue to operate based on its reasonable
belief in the house corporation's representations that it had changed its Bylaws.
B.

DDD can enforce the house corporation's Bylaws.

DDD is the parent of the house corporation. The entities' Bylaws form a contract
between the parties. Even if they didn't, DDD is an intended third party beneficiary of
the house corporation's Bylaws. As DDD has paid ample consideration, the house

14

corporation's decision to amend its Bylaws to provide that the property would vest in
DDD upon deactivation of the local chapter, the district court's grant of summary
judgment was correct and should be affirmed.
1.

DDD pled a breach of contract claim.

The house corporation protests to the district court's order because it claims that
DDD never pled a breach of contract cause of action. This is incorrect, and at most, it is
harmless. Given Utah's liberalized notice pleading system as well as the terms of the
Complaint, the house corporation is incorrect that a breach of contract cause of action
was never pled. The Complaint alleges that the house corporation exists "pursuant to
certain Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws that specify its rights and obligations,
including certain obligations to DDD." (R. 3, f 9).
It further alleges that under the Bylaws, "[conveyance of the title to [the property]
of [the house corporation] is required upon inactivation of the chapter" and that "despite
the withdrawal of the charter of the [local chapter] and the inactivation of the [local
chapter], the [house corporation] has refused to convey title to the property to DDD." Id.
at fi 13, 14. DDD therefore pled that there was an obligation which was breached, and it
prays for specific performance of the promise to convey the property. (R. 4, ff 21-25; 6.)
That is a claim for breach of contract.
The house corporation understood the house corporation had pled a breach of
contract claim. It briefed only the issue of consideration—a uniquely contract doctrine—
in its opposition to DDD's motion for summary judgment. (See generally R. 188-195.)
During oral argument, the house corporation admitted that the outcome of the case was
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not dependant on how DDD chose to plead its case. (R. 577, 16-17). It has therefore
admitted that any error in granting summary judgment on the notice pleading issue was
harmless. This issue cannot therefore be the basis for reversal of the district court's
ruling.
2.

DDD, as the house corporation's parent, can enforce the Bylaws.

Courts have long held that charters and Bylaws of national and local fraternal
organizations form a contract between the national and local organization that either can
sue to enforce. See Grand Lodge of Iowa v. Osceola Lodge No. 18., 178 N.W.2d 362,
369 (Iowa 1970). "Most, if not all, courts and authorities generally agree that
constitutions, charters, and by-laws of charitable fraternal organization, subscribed to by
its members, are binding. . .. The charter of a subordinate lodge and the constitution and
by-laws of the parent organizations constitute a contract between the two." Id. at 368,
citing 10 C.J.S. Beneficial Organizations § 60.
By its nature, the house corporation, as a title holding entity, is the subsidiary of
DDD. (R. 257, 259.) It is required to adopt bylaws in line with DDD's, and it agreed to
do so. (R. 259) ("House corporations shall adopt bylaws and make rules and regulations
in conformity with these [DDD's] Bylaws, Model Bylaws for House Corporations and in
accordance with current Fraternity policies."). DDD has a legal right to enforce the
contracts into which the house corporation entered with it when it amended its Bylaws in
1991. (R. 369.)
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3.

DDD can enforce the Bylaws as a third party beneficiary.

The house corporation's Affidavit of Incorporation and Bylaws intend to convey a
benefit upon DDD. {See R. 376.) Therefore, the district court was correct that even if
DDD is not a party to the house corporation's Bylaws, DDD is entitled to enforce the
Bylaws as a third party beneficiary. "Third party beneficiaries are 'persons who are
recognized as having enforceable rights created in them by a contract to which they are
not parties and for which they give no consideration.'" Rio Algom Corp, v. JIMCO LTD,,
618 P.2d 497, 506 (Utah 1980), citing 4 Corbin on Contracts § 774 (1960). Third party
beneficiaries may enforce terms of a contract if the contracting parties intended to
"confer a separate and distinct benefit" on the third party. Id, citing Clark v. American
Standard, Inc., 583 P.2d 618 (Utah 1978).
Whether a third party may enforce a contract "is determined by examining a
written contract." Am, Towers Owners Ass'n., Inc. v. CCIMech,f Inc., 930 P.2d 1182,
1188 (Utah 1996). Contracts which unambiguously confer a benefit on a third party are
interpreted as a matter of law. Wagner v. Clifton, 2002 UT 109, f 12, 62 P.3d 440, citing
and quoting WebBank v. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, f 19, 54 P.3d 1139.
"[I]f the written contract's clear intent is to confer rights upon a third party, [the third
party may] enforce the rights and obligations of the contract." Id. at f 13.
"It is well established that the bylaws of a corporation, together with the articles of
incorporation . .. constitute a contract. . .." Swan Creek Village Homeowners Ass'n v.
Warne, 2006 UT 22, f 46, 134 P.3d 1122, citing and quoting Turner v. Hi-Country
Homeowners Ass'n, 910 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Utah 1996). Like other contracts, bylaws and
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articles or affidavits of incorporation can and often do have third party beneficiaries who
may legally enforce them even though they are strangers to the contract and the
consideration. See, e.g., In the Matter of Baldwin-United Corp., 43 B.R. 443, 459 (S.D.
Ohio 1984) (recognizing third party beneficiaries' rights to enforce corporate bylaws).
The case of The National Board of Examiners for Osteopathic Physicians and
Surgeons, Inc. v. American Osteopathic Association, 645 N.E.2d 608 (Ind. App. 1994), is
instructive. There, the Indiana Court of Appeals, relying on the same "fundamental
principals]" as Utah courts, held that the American Osteopathic Association ("AOA"), a
non-profit corporation, had standing to enforce a provision in the National Board of
Examiner's ("NBEOP") bylaws which stated that the NBEOP, another non-profit
corporation, had to obtain the AOA's consent before appointing any directors. Id. at 618.
The AOA, even though it was not in privity of contract with the NBEOP or its members
or directors, could enforce the NBEOP's bylaws. Id. The AOA was a third party
beneficiary entitled to enforce the bylaws. Id.
Similarly, even if DDD is not a party to the contracts at issue here, the clauses
unambiguously promise a benefit to DDD which confer third party beneficiary status on
DDD. The house corporation's 1991 Bylaws, upon which the house corporation relied in
its Motion for Summary Judgment, provide:
Upon inactivation of the chapter, the house corporation shall be dissolved
and all right, title, and interest in any and to any assets held or owned by the
house corporation shall revert to and become vested in Delta Delta Delta
(R. 231, f 11; 376.) This clause unambiguously confers a benefit: the right to have title
to the property conveyed to it upon inactivation of the local chapter. The district court
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correctly held that DDD was an intended third party beneficiary with standing to enforce
the Articles and Bylaws. (R. 615.)
The house corporation argues that DDD improperly raised the argument that it is a
third party beneficiary in oral argument. This is wrong. DDD properly raised the
doctrine in its Reply Memorandum in response to the house corporation's suggestion that
it had no standing to enforce the Bylaws. (R. 529-530.) The district court appropriately
considered the argument and reached the correct conclusion thereon.
Moreover, if this Court finds that DDD was not a party to the contract, but rather
was a third party beneficiary, DDD does not need to show that it provided consideration
for the bargain to make it enforceable. Third-party beneficiaries may enforce their rights
in a contract even if they are strangers to the contract and the underlying consideration.
17A Am. Jur.2d Contracts § 434 (2008).
4.

DDD paid consideration to support the amended Bylaws.

The house corporation's only argument in opposition to DDD's Motion for
Summary Judgment was that DDD did not pay consideration for the house corporation's
promise to vest title in the property in DDD upon deactivation of the local chapter. (R.
188-197.) The district court correctly found that consideration was paid by DDD as well
as the local chapter in the form of money and support for the house corporation. If the
house corporation refused to adopt the Model Bylaws, the support from DDD would stop,
and DDD could cause the house corporation to dissolve. DDD's decision not to take
these steps constitutes consideration. This Court should affirm this holding, as it is
proved by the undisputed facts in the record.
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It is undisputed that DDD's organization and support structure provided the local
chapter and in turn the house corporation with resources required to function. DDD
President Michelle Popp Shimberg describes the relationship between the parties as a
tripartite "working relationship" in which DDD—an expert in running sororities—
provided support services, cash grants, and tenants to the local chapter and the house
corporation. (R. 258-268.) The house corporation admits that as part of this relationship,
DDD paid to improve the property. (R. 241, 500.) The house corporation admits that
DDD sent advisors multiple times in an attempt to shore up the viability of the flagging
local chapter. (R. 236, 499.) It admits that the local chapter and the tenants it provided
were a primary source of operating income. (R. 241, 500.) It is finally undisputed that
DDD procured for the house corporation insurance with favorable terms and rates. (R.
242, 500.) The undisputed facts, admitted as true in the house corporation's
Memorandum in Opposition, show that consideration was paid.
That consideration was also contemporaneous to the house corporation assenting
to DDD's request that it amend its Affidavit of Incorporation and Bylaws. (R. 219.)
DDD could decertify the local chapter if the house corporation failed to adopt the Bylaws
and Affidavit of Incorporation that DDD requested that they adopt. (R. 238-240.)
When DDD asked the house corporation to amend its Affidavit of Incorporation
and Bylaws in the early 1990s, the benefits (and the continued existence) of the house
corporation was at stake. In consideration for the house corporation adopting the Model
Bylaws, DDD continued to provide it with the very means of its existence. There is
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nothing in the record suggesting that DDD would have been required to continue to give
these benefits to the house corporation if it refused to amend its Affidavit of
Incorporation and Bylaws. In fact, it would seem that to do so would have violated
DDD's Bylaws. (R. 240.)
DDD therefore continued to incur a legal determinant that inured to the house
corporation that it had no obligation to provide as part of the bargain in which the house
corporation changed its Affidavit of Incorporation and Bylaws. This is consideration. As
this is the only issue properly preserved and before this Court, the district court's order
should be affirmed because consideration was provided for the amendment to the
Affidavit of Incorporation and Bylaws.
C.

The 1991 Bylaws and 1992 Affidavit of Incorporation are in full effect and
enforceable at law.

After accepting benefits it received from DDD because it adopted amended
Bylaws, the house corporation now argues that the documents under which it operated for
over a decade cannot be enforced. Its arguments are not preserved and inapposite to the
house corporation's obligation to transfer title to DDD.
1.

The house corporation's belated attempts to invalidate the Bylaws it
adopted and under which it operated are not preserved.

In its Opposition to DDD's Motion for Summary Judgment, the house corporation
chose not to argue that the new Affidavit of Incorporation and Bylaws adopted by the
house corporation were somehow legally ineffective. (R. 385-395.) It did not
incorporate that defense in its Opposition, and the district court was never presented with
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or had the ability to decide the issue. As such, the argument was not preserved for
appeal, and it should not be considered.
2.

The house corporation fails to show that the Bylaws under which it
has operated since 1992 are illegal or unenforceable.

In arguing that the Bylaws that unambiguously require the house corporation to
convey the property to DDD cannot be enforced under Utah law, the house corporation
again focuses on whether or not it would be legal for DDD to force its dissolution. The
point is irrelevant. The district court expressly declined to grant summary judgment on
the issue. (R. 613-617.) More importantly, the district court ordered the house
corporation to convey the property to DDD not because the house corporation was
dissolved, but because the local chapter was inactivated. (R. 614-616.)
The house corporation's contention that the amended Bylaws only require it to
convey title to the property when it is dissolved is also not preserved (see Section I,
supra), and it is incorrect. Moreover, even if this Court considers whether the Bylaws
were legally enacted, the voting and procedural issues raised by the house corporation
deal only with the property rights of members of the house corporation. (Appellant's Br.
18-21.)
This case is not one in which a board of directors voted on dividends or property
entitlements of its shareholders. The members of the house corporation did not own the
property, the house corporation did. (R. 190.) The house corporation's unpreserved
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argument that the Bylaws cannot be enforced therefore fails to show that the Bylaws are
unenforceable.
D.

Dissolution of the house corporation is not a condition precedent to
conveyance of the property to DDD.

The house corporation's Bylaws are clear. Upon deactivation of the local chapter,
it was to dissolve and vest title in DDD. (R. 376.) It is true that a section of the Affidavit
of Incorporation calls for liquidation of all of the house corporation's assets upon
dissolution of the house corporation, but as the house corporation has not dissolved, that
provision is inapposite. The dissolution provisions have no bearing whatsoever on the
enforceability of the provisions governing conveyance to DDD upon deactivation of the
local chapter.
1.

This argument is not preserved.

As argued in Section I above, affirmative defenses raised in an answer but ignored
in briefing of summary judgment are not preserved for appeal. The house corporation
chose not to raise the issue of whether dissolution of the house corporation was a
condition precedent to transfer of the property. The house corporation never briefed the
issue or gave the trial court an opportunity to analyze the issue. It is therefore not
preserved and not properly before this Court.

2

The house corporation's arguments are further undercut by its stated purpose
with regards to the property: "to acquire and hold title to real estate and personal property
and provide for the management and use thereof for the sole use and benefit of Theta Phi
Chapter of Delta Delta Delta Fraternity... ." (R. 202.) Therefore, consistent with the
Model Bylaws and the Bylaws of DDD, title to the property should vest in DDD upon
deactivation of the local chapter. Any action taken by the house corporation with regards
to the property after deactivation would be ultra vires.
23

2.

The house corporation's Bylaws unambiguously require it to vest
title in the property to DDD upon deactivation of the local chapter.

The house corporation incorrectly contends that its dissolution was a condition
precedent to conveying the property to DDD under the 1991 Bylaws. Its argument is
based on a misreading of its own Bylaws, which unambiguously require both dissolution
and conveyance of the property to DDD upon deactivation of the local chapter. The
Bylaws provide:
Upon inactivation of the chapter [the Theta Phi Chapter of DDD], the house
corporation shall be dissolved and all right, title, and interest in and to any
assets held or owned by the house corporation shall revert to and become
vested in Delta Delta Delta, an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, and shall
be dealt with by that Delta Delta Delta corporation and the Fraternity in the
manner provided for in the respective Bylaws of those bodies.
(R. 213) (emphasis added). Whether the house corporation dissolved or not, it is required
by its Bylaws to transfer the property to DDD. Id.
The house corporation's argument makes a straw man out of the requirements it
adopted in its Bylaws. Instead of analyzing the unambiguous language cited above, it
relies on a paragraph that specifically addresses the house corporation's obligations after
its own dissolution, not the deactivation of the local chapter. (Appellant Br. 21-22.) Its
arguments thus miss the point of this dispute. The local chapter had to be dissolved, and
thus, the house corporation was required to vest title to the property in DDD as well as
dissolve. (R. 213.) There is no condition precedent to the transfer of the property.
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E.

The house corporation's reversion argument is based on a misreading of
the Bylaws.

As discussed above, the house corporation was required to vest title of all of the
assets to DDD upon deactivation of the local chapter. (R. 376.) It is true that all property
was to revert to DDD as well. However, assuming that title in the property is not subject
to reversion, DDD is still entitled to enforce the plain language requiring the house
corporation to vest title in the property in DDD. Id. The house corporation's arguments
regarding reversion are therefore a red herring and are inapposite to the district court's
ruling that required the house corporation to vest title to the property in DDD.
1.

This argument is unpreserved.

As argued in Section I above, the house corporation chose not to argue that under
its Bylaws, DDD was only entitled to reversion. Review of this argument is therefore
barred under the preservation rule. As described below, the argument is incorrect.
2.

The house corporation's Bylaws require it to vest title in all its
property upon deactivation of the local chapter.

The house corporation's argument that DDD is only entitled to reversion fails to
properly analyze a conjunctive provision of its Bylaws. Upon deactivation of the local
chapter, all property owned by the house corporation "automatically shall revert to and
become vested in Delta Delta Delta, an Illinois not-for-profit-corporation...." (R. 376)
(emphasis added). Upon deactivation of the local chapter, DDD was therefore entitled to
both reversion and the right to have title to the property vest in its ownership. (R. 617.)
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III.

THE HOUSE CORPORATION'S BYLAWS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES.
The unbriefed suggestion that the house corporation can avoid the plain terms of

its Bylaws because of the rule against perpetuities is unpreserved and incorrect. The trial
court was not presented with the issue. Moreover, and as important, as DDD is a
charitable organization, the rule would not apply even if review was appropriate.
A.

This argument is not preserved.

As argued in Section I above, inserting an affirmative defense into one's Answer
does not preserve that defense for appellate review if it is not raised in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment. In opposition to DDD's Motion for Summary Judgment,
the house corporation never argued that any part of its Bylaws or Affidavit of
Incorporation were void under the common-law rule against perpetuities. (R. 494-504.)
It pointed out no facts related to when or if DDD's interest in the house would vest. Id.
It therefore tacitly admits that the rule against perpetuities defense is inapplicable and
legally waived its right to raise the issue on appeal. The trial court never had a chance to
rule on the application of the rule, nor did DDD have a chance to point out the reasons
why the rule is inapplicable. The preservation rule thus bars review of this issue.
B.

The charitable purpose exclusion excludes the application of the rule.

The charitable exception to the rule against perpetuities is as old as the rule itself.
Because DDD is a non-profit, fraternal corporation organized for charitable purposes, the
language in the house corporation's Bylaws which ultimately led to title being vested in
DDD is not subject to the rule against perpetuities. The rule against perpetuities "does
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not apply to grants, devises, or bequests to charitable uses." Staines v. Burton, 53 P.
1015, 1015 (Utah 1898); see also Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U.S. 342, 354 (1897) (the
rule against perpetuities "does not apply to a gift to or for the benefit of a charity").
Courts hold that fraternal organizations such as DDD and its subsidiaries such as
the house corporation are charitable for purposes of the rule against perpetuities. See,
e.g., In re Hartung's Estate, 160 P. 782, 783-784 (Nev. 1916) (finding that a gift to a
fraternal order was not subject to the rule against perpetuities); United Bank, Inc. v.
Blosser, 624 S.E.2d 815, 823 (W.V. App. 2005) (recognizing a West Virginia statute
mandating that the rule against perpetuities does not apply to conveyances to fraternal
organizations).
Under the above rule, the interest created in favor of DDD is exempt from scrutiny
under the rule against perpetuities. DDD, a non-profit fraternal organization, is charitable
in nature. (R. 1-2.)
The purpose of Delta Delta Delta shall be to establish a perpetual bond of
friendship among its members, to develop a stronger and more womanly
character, to broaden the moral and intellectual life, and to assist its
members in every possible way. It shall also be the purpose of Delta Delta
Delta to promote and develop mutually beneficial relationships between the
Fraternity and the colleges and universities where the the Fraternity has
established chapters, to develop qualities of unselfish leadership among its
members, and to encourage them to assume, with integrity and devotion to
moral and democratic principles, the highest responsibilities of college
women.
(R. 308.) The charitable purpose of the organization is further evidenced by its codified
philanthropic goals. "The Fraternity's philanthropy shall be Children's Cancer Charities
and the Fraternity's philanthropic mission shall be to promote such charities." (R. 312.)
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DDD's charitable mission of aiding children afflicted by cancer, as well as its
goals of developing women of upstanding moral character, removes the impetus for
applying the rule against perpetuities. {See R. 308, 312.) The clause in the house
corporation's Bylaws that requires it to vest title in DDD upon deactivation of the local
chapter allows DDD to pursue its charitable purposes with as little waste as possible. The
rule against perpetuities arguments proffered by the house corporation, even if preserved,
should be rejected.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, DDD respectfully submits district court's order should
be affirmed in all respects.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of December, 2008.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

John R. Lurifa
Murry W^mank
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